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Abstract
Politically or ideologically motivated speech has been the primary focus of
much of the recent political, legal, and academic debate on restrictions on
speech imposed as a reaction to perceived threats to national and
international security. However, restrictions imposed on informing speech as
a response to the threat of terrorism raise equally serious concerns. The
development of the body of knowledge relies on the free flow of information,
including persuasive speech. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11 and
the subsequent anthrax attacks in the US, the issue ofcensorship of scientific
information has been subject of debate in both government and scientific
circles.
This paper analyses the ways restrictions affect the dissemination of
knowledge-based information arising from the censoring of scholarly
scientific' journals, and at what point a balance can be found between
scientific freedom and national security. Is censorship the most appropriate
response to the perceived threat of terrorists utilising published scientific
information? Can an objective and rational assessment of the threat of
terrorism be made in the current political climate? Consideration is given to
alternatives to the implementation of a regime of censorship that could be
tailored to limit the burden imposed on research in any trade off between
scientific progress and national security concerns.
1. Introduction
Politically or ideologically motivated speech has been the primary
focus of much of the recent political, legal, and academic debate on
restrictions on speech imposed as a reaction to perceived threats to
national and international security. However, restrictions imposed on
informing speech as a response to the threat of terrorism raise equally
serious concerns. The development of the body of knowledge relies
on the free flow of information, including persuasive speech.! Since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the subsequent anthrax
attacks in the US, the issue of censorship oJ scientific information has
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been subject of debate in both government and scientific circles. The
focus of this paper is on the ways in which restrictions affect speech,
the purpose of which is to inform rather than persuade, specifically
scientific information.
In the first section, legislative restrictions imposed on the
dissemination of scientific information are considered. Included are
those laws that, although in force prior to September 2001, empower
U.S. and Australian governments to restrict informing speech for the
purpose of national security. Of greatest concern, however, is the
threat to the dissemination of knowledge-based information arising
from the censoring of scholarly scientific journals.2 It is
acknowledged that restrictions on the free flow of informing speech
are imposed out of commercial considerations;3 however, this paper
analyses only those restrictions imposed directly by government or as
a response to government. The focus of the second section is on the
way the editors of scientific publications have reacted to national
security concerns. Are scholarly journals imposing, or having
imposed, unreasonable restrictions on contributions to the body of
knowledge because of concerns for national security? In section three,
the relative importance of scientific freedom is analysed; and in the
final sections, the future of scientific freedom is considered. Can, in
the current political climate, an objective and rational assessment of
the threat of terrorism be made? Does the threat of the use by
terrorists of scientific information freely disseminated justify the
imposition of a censorship regime; or are there practical alternatives to
censorship?
2 Scientific research is also subject to limitations on the availability of
biological and chemical agents used for research purposes. For example,
see USA PATRIOT Act 18 USC s 175(c); The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act Pub. Law No. 107-188, 116
Stat. 593 (2002). In Australia, similar restrictions are found, inter alia, in.
the Weapons ofMass Destruction (Prevention ofProliferation) Act 1995 (Cth),
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), and the Patents Act 1990 (Cth).
3 Restrictions on the free flow of informing speech are imposed out of
commercial considerations. However, this paper analyses restrictions
imposed directly by government or as a response to government
concerns over national security. Resnick considers three distinct reasons
for private corporations to impose restrictions on sponsored research:
Intellectual property rights; trade secrets; and data adverse to company
interests. See Resnik, David B, 'Some Recent Challenges to Openness
and Freedom in Scientific Publication', Michiel Korthals and Robert J
Bogers, eds, Proceedings of the Frontis workshop on Ethics for Life Scientists,
Wageningen, The Netherlands 18-21 May 2003, Chapter 6a, Wageningen
UR Frontis Series, available at http://library.wur.
nl /frontis! ethics! Dha resnik.pdf. accessed November 3, 2006.
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2. Legislative Restrictions on the Free Flow of
Informing Speech
'Scientists are not in the age of innocence anymore. And they should be
aware ofthe moral implications ofwhat they're doing. '4
In most western democracies, freedom of speech has generally come
to be accepted as one of many rights and interests that need to be
considered by both legislatures and courts, to be balanced against
competing rights or interests.s The value of speech is often
determined, both politically and legally, by reference to categories
into which it has been divided. Typically based on content or by
reference to the likely effect of the expression, the value given can be
determinative of the weight to be attributed when in competition with
other values, interests, or rights. This allows legislatures and courts to
exclude or limit speech considered particularly abhorrent or harmful.6
Researchers and academics, particularly those involved in the
physical sciences, depend on the open dissemination of research and
discussion of information contained therein. Researchers typically
build upon the published works of others. Teachers utilise these
works to broaden their scholarship. The publication and distribution
of research is essential to the cumulative development of the body of
human knowledge, with research outcomes published widely and
available internationally. The process of scrutinising information is a
necessary part of the search for scientific truths. Scrutiny by others
allows for the identification of errors and omissions and for the
development and refinement of information. However, information
intended to benefit society by contributing to the body of knowledge
can have dual or multiple use applications, beneficial and malevolent,
legitimate and illegitimate, with ramifications for both national and
international security, particularly if significant knowledge or
technical data is communicated widely through publication, on the
internet or at conferences. It is at this point that legislative restrictions
become relevant.
Legislative restrictions on the flow of informing speech in both the
United States and Australia have focussed on information seen as the
4 Garrett, L, Scientists Advocate Greater Security, Newsday. October 14,
200l.
S Eg. New Zealand, Canada, UK, USA. In contrast with these nations,
where freedom of speech receives some degree of constitutional
protection,' free speech in Australia is merely a residual right. That is,
the freedom to speak exists only to the extent that it is not restricted by
operation of the common law or statute. This is modified to a degree by
the implied constitutional freedom to discuss matters of political and
governmental concern, as recognised by the High Court. See Lange v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, [1997) HCA 25;
Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; [2004) HCA 39.
6 This includes censorship of hate speech, politically motivated speech
and offensive speech.
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property of the government, or that having implications for national
security or defence.7 In the US, the Congress, in 1911, enacted the
Defense Secrets Act. This statute was quite similar to the British Offici11l
Secrets Act,S imposing penalties on possession of 'information
respecting the national defense' and presuming the existence of
'national defense secrets', but not providing a further definition.9 The
Espionage Act, introduced in 1917, replaced the Defense Secrets Act, and
prohibited the gathering and/ or dissemination of information relating
to 'national defense'.lo In 1917, the Trading with the Enemy Act was
passed by Congress to allow strict controls over trade with nations at
war with the US.11 Most controversial of the powers granted to the
Executive was the authority of the President to designate as a national
secret patents whose publication might 'be detrimental to the public
safety or defense, or may assist the enemy or endanger the successful
prosecution of the war'12, including information developed through
7 Developments in cryptography have also been subject to international
agreements, such as The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, requiring
legislative restrictions on the export of proscribed forms of information.
However, in recent years legislative restrictions on the dissemination of
research into cryptography have also been imposed to prevent the
circumvention of Digital Rights Management technologies. See the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (Cth).
S Restrictions on speech having defence or security implications were first
introduced by the United Kingdom during the Crimean War in the late
19th century. In August 1889, the Official Secrets Act was passed by
Parliament, imposing prohibitions on the disseminating information about
British military facilities, warships, and weapons. In 1911 the scope of the
Act was broadened to give the government full discretion over what
information would be considered secret or confidential. Arvin S Quist,
Security Classification of Information, Volume 1. 'Introduction, History,
and Adverse Impacts', at 21 available at
http://fas.org/s~p/library/quist/chap 2.html. accessed February 15
2007. See also Andrew Patterson, Jr., "CONFIDENT/AL"-The Beginning
of Defense-Information Marking, Sterling Chemistry Laboratory, Yale
University, New Haven, Conn., unpUblished manuscript, April 30, 1980,
at 6, cited in Quist, above.
9 Ericson, Timothy L., 'Presidential address to Society of American .
Archivists', 68th Annual Meeting, Boston, August 5, 2004. The published'
version appeared in the American Archivist, Vol. 68 (Spring/Summer
2005), pp 18-52., available at
http:// www .archivists.or~Igovernance I presidential Iericson.asp.
accessed October 22, 2006.
10 SeCtion 1. See 18 USC Ch 37 s 793. Additional prohibitions on the
disclosure of information created by the government are to be found in
50 USC, s 421, prohibiting the disclosure of the identity of covert
intelligence personnel.
11 Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, Ch. 106, §lO(i), 40 Stat. 422.
Prior to this statute, the Commissioner of Patents had the discretionary
power to refuse the granting of patents on the basis of 'national interest'.
See Quist, above n 8 at 22.
12 Ibid.
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privately funded research.13 This Presidential authority lasted only
for the duration of the First World War, but the authority was again
invoked in October 1941, shortly before the US's entry into World War
II. Secrecy orders remained effective for two years, at which time they
were renewable. 14 The extension of this executive power came with
the passage of the Invention Secrecy Act in 1951, which granted
authority to the Commissioner of Patents, in consultation with the
heads of a number of Federal agencies, to designate as secret those
patents for inventions and technologies perceived to create a risk of
threat to the 'national security' of the United States. IS A secrecy order
prohibits the granting of a U.S. patent and the filing of foreign patent
applications. Also prohibited is the disclosure or publication of any
information or ideas contained in the patent application.16 The order
can be issued over both patents in which the government has a
proprietary interest, and privately developed inventions in which the
government has no proprietary interest. If it is determined that
publication or disclosure by the grant of patent poses a threat to
national security, the Patent Commissioner must issue an order that
the invention be kept secret, and 'shall withhold the grant of a patent
... for such period as the national interest requires.... 'P The invention
is then deemed secret for one year, but this is renewable if an ongoing
need for secrecy is considered necessary.18 Secrecy orders issued
during a time of national emergency remain effective for the duration
of the emergency plus six months. 19 To ensure full compliance with
the secrecy order, approval of the Patents Commissioner must be
granted before a U.s.-based inventor files a foreign patent application
or registers a design or model with a foreign patent office. Penalties
for breaching a secrecy order issued under the legislation include a
fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both.2o By July 2006, there were 4942 patent secrecy orders in effect.21
13 Quist, above n 8 at 22.
14 Ibid
15 35 United State Code (USC) - Patents, Part II - Patentability Of






21 Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy, result
of Freedom of Information application to the u.s. Patents and Trade
Office, October 2006, available at
http:// wwwJas.ort;: I s~p I othergov I invention Istats.pdf. accessed
February 18,2007.
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The Atomic Energy Act22 saw the legislative implementation of a 'born
secret' policy, with most information concerning nuclear technology
classified from the time of its inception, by creating a category of
"Restricted Data" .23 Both the Invention Secrecy Act and the Atomic
Energy Act came about at times of advances in technologies that had
potential military applications and the increased fear of threats to
national security from hostile nation states. By the late 1990s, fear of
terrorism, from both state and non-state actors, domestic and foreign,
led to the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,24
a suite of laws that aimed at preventing terrorism. Included in the
legislation was a prohibition 011 the provision of material support or
resources, including information that could be used in the making of
bombs or other weapons, to any person knowing or intending that it
be used in preparing for, or carrying out, a specified list of terrorist
offences. An additional restriction was imposed in September 2003
when the Federal Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting
under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act25, issued an embargo on the peer review or editing of scientific
publications by authors resident in countries under a U.S. trade
embargo.26 Penalties imposed under this Act included fines of up to
$50,000 or 10 years imprisonment,27 In April 2004, the OFAC lifted
the prohibition on the editing and peer reviewing of manuscripts
submitted to publications of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE),28 acknowledging that IEEE's publishing activities
came within trade law that exempted the exchange of information
from sanctions, although there is doubt that this exemption extends to
other scientific publishers.29
22 42 USC 2011, Chapter 12. See also James C Goodale, 'Born Oassified' -
The 'Progressive' Magazine Case, New York Law Journal, March 23, 1979,
Page 1, Column 1.
23 This included 'all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization
of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3)
the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.' See
Atomic Energy Act 1954, ch. 1073, § l1(r). See also Goodale, above n 22.
24 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 323,_
110 Stat. 1214, 1255 (1996).
25 50 USC Sections 1701-1707.
26 Science and Security in the Post-9111 Environment, Scientific Publication
Policies, The American Association for the Advancement of Science,
available at http://lVww.aaas.org Ispp I post911 I publishing I, accessed
2 Nov 2006.
27 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, United States Code Title
50, Chapter 35, s..1705.
28 Above, n 26.
29 Ibid. Also see Jean Kugamai and William Sweet, U.S. Treasury
Department Issues Free Press Ruling, Spectrum Online. 12 April 2004,
available at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org / apr04 / inthisissue.
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Like the US, legislative restrictions on informing speech in Australia
,have focused on the Idisclosure of information owned by the
government or that is seen as having direct implications for defence or
national security. In Australia, there is no 'Official Secrets' legislation
per se.30 Sections 78-80 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) cover
unauthorized disclosure of Commonwealth information classified as
confidentiaJ.31 However, like the US, the principle source of federal
legislative power to restrict the flow of informing speech is patents
law. The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) contains two separate sources of
power enabling the Commissioner of Patents to apply prohibition
orders against information about inventions. Chapter 15 of the Patents
Act empowers the Commissioner to prohibit or otherwise restrict the
publication of information contained in a patent application where the
information is considered primarily concerned with 'associated
technologies'. That is, the design, production, operation, testing or
use of equipment or plant for the enrichment of nuclear material, the
reprocessing of irradiated nuclear material, the production of heavy
water or nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.32 This
definition of 'associated technologies' in the Patents Act is taken from
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth), which also
restricts the possession of information on nuclear energy and
weaponry without Government authority.33
30 For an analysis of official secrecy in Australian information policy see G
Terrill, Secrecy & Openness: The Federal Government From Menzies To
Whit/am & Beyond, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2000.
31 An informal, non-enforceable arrangement between the Commonwealth
and the media, based on the UK's DA Notice system, operates to restrict
the publication of certain information. D notices are issued to the media
by the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Committee on subjects which are
considered to have a bearing on Australia's defence or national security.
Four D Notices are considered operative, including a prohibition on the
disclosure of information about the Australian Security Intelligence
Service or its employees. However, the Defence Press and Broadcasting
Committee has not met since 1982 and attempts by the Keating
Government to revive the Committee did not proceed. See Dr Pauline
Sadler, The D-Notice System, at
http://www.presscoundl.ort:.au/pcsite I apcnewsl mayOn I dnote.htmL
accessed March 14, 2007. Additionally, prohibitions;on the disclosure of
information about the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation or
its employees are to be found in section 18 of the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth).
32 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), Section 151.
33 Section 4 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth)
defines associated technology as:
any document that contains information (other than information that is
lawfully available, whether within Australia or outside Australia and
whether for a price or free of charge, to the public or a section of the
public):
(a) that is applicable primarily to the design, production, operation,
testing or use of:
(i) equipment or plant for:
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The combined effect of the Patents Act 1990 and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 is that all information concerning
nuclear science is, again like the US, subject to restriction from the
moment of its inception. Additional restrictions on information arise
through the Weapons ofMass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act
1995 (Cth), which prohibits the 'supply or export of goods that will or
may be used in, and the provision of services that will or may assist,
the development, production, acquisition or stockpiling of weapons
capable of causing mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering
such weapons. '34 Section 4 of the Act defines 'goods' as including
documents. A second, broader, power of prohibition exists in the
Patents Act 1990. Similar to the power granted under the US'
Inventions Secrecy Act, section 173 of the Patents Act 1990 authorises the
Commissioner of Patents to prohibit or restrict the granting of a patent
and the publication of information about the subject matter of the
application where it is deemed to be 'necessary or expedient in the
interests of the defence of the Commonwealth. '35 The patent
application is checked after filing, and if it is considered necessary, a
prohibition order is placed on it. The application then continues
through the normal examination process, and may be accepted, but it
is never published and can therefore not be sealed (i.e. cannot be
'granted'). Once issued, a prohibition order prevents information
about. the patent, including any specifications, being made public, and
the patent application must be refused.36 The penalty for a breach of a
prohibition order is a maximum of 2 years imprisonment.37 If the
prohibition order is revoked, it can then be published, and may be
sealed (assuming all the other requirements have been met). There
are currently 40 patent applications with a prohibition order placed on
(A) the enrichment of nuclear material;
(B) the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear material;
or
(C) the production of heavy water; or
(ii) nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or
(b) to which a prescribed international agreement applies and that is of a'
kind declared by the Minister, in writing, to oe information to which this
definition applies; and includes any photograph, model or other thing
from which such information may be obtained or deduced.
34 Preamble to the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation)
Act1995.
35 Section 173 (1) Patents Act 1990. This section also enables the prohibition
of access to micro-organisms deposited for a patent application.
Information subject of a prohibition or restriction order under this
section is exempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act
1982 (Cth). See Schedule 3, FOI Act.
36 Section 174 Patents Act 1990.
37 Section 173 (2) Patents Act 1990.
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3. National Security, Censorship and Scientific
Journals
Advances in society are generally reliant upon the knowledge base
developed from information provided by others, which typically
come about through a process of review, testing, and evaluation,
mostly by peers in the same field. Information from a variety of
disciplines often provide for the cross fertilization of ideas, and
information developed in one field or for a specific purpose may
influence a variety of fields. The sharing of research outcomes has
generally been free from the imposition of censorship, both imposed
by government or self-censorship, although, as discussed above, there
are notable exceptions where information falls within a limited
category where the knowledge isof relevance to nuclear energy, and
nuclear, chemical, or biological weaponry.39 In the late 1930s,
physicists involved in research on nuclear fission willingly entered
into an agreement to self-censor the publication of their research to
prevent the information being utilised by Germany.40 This led, in the
early 1940s, to the establishment of the National Academy of Sciences'
National Research Council Advisory Committee on Scientific
Publications, ·which voluntarily imposed, with the cooperation of the
publishers of scientific journals, a prohibition on the publication of
information relating to nuclear physics produced within the private
research sector.41
The publication of research which has received funding, or other
material support, from the U.S. Government has traditionally been
free from government interference unless it has a Classified status for
national security or defence purposes.42 This policy was confirmed in
1985, with the release of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
189, establishing a 'national policy for controlling the flow of science,
technology, and engineering information produced in federally-
38 Information provided November 9 2006 by Jackie Carroll, Assistant
Director, Ministerial Support, Research & Projects, IP Australia,
contactable at Jacqueline.Carroll@ipaustralia.gov.au. Historical and
statistical data about the number of patent applications that have had a
prohibition order placed on them is not generally available. However, to
give some context to these figures, in the year July 1993 - June 1994
20,000 patent applications were lodged in Australia. By the year July
2004 - June 2005 that figure had increased to over 32,000.
39 Laura K Donohue, 'Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression'
(2005) 27:1 Cardozo Law Review 272.
40 Peter J Westwick, In the Beginning: The Origins of Nuclear Secrecy, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 56, (Nov IDee 2000), pp 43-49.
41 Dana A Shea, Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security
Concerns: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research service,
Washington, 2003 at 6.
42 Ibid at 7.
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funded fundamental research at colleges, universities, and
laboratories.'43 NSDD 189 formalised Government policy, stating:
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum extent
possible, the products of fundamental research remain
unrestricted ...No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or
reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not
received national security classification, except as provided in
applicable U.S. Statutes.44
However, the threat of terrorism has sparked renewed debate on the
need for the imposition of legal restrictions on the publication of
scientific and technical information. In February 2001, the Journal of
Virology45 published a paper outlining the research findings of a group
of scientists at the Co-operative Research Centre for the Biological
Control of Pest Animals (CRe) at the Australian National
University.46 The purpose of the research had been to develop a
means causing infertility in mice by infecting them with a modified
strain of the mousepox virus. The published paper reported that the
researchers had inadvertently found that previously immune mice
were again susceptible to mousepox when injected with a genetically
modified strain of the virus.47 Discussion of the publication of the
paper outside the scientific community was limited to some minor
newspaper coverage until late 2001.48 Concerns over the availability
of scientific information, particularly in the field of microbiology, then
became an issue of public debate. This caused a shift in the political
spotlight onto the dangers to national security posed by scientific
publications. Despite the U.S. Government's awareness of the
development of biological and chemical weaponry by several states,
including Iraq, it was not until the attacks of September 11, and the
subsequent use of anthrax to attack targets within the US, that the U.S.
Government prioritised the threat posed by the hostile use of
biological agents. By December 2001, the U.s. Government had begun
to question editorial decisions to publish articles that may contain
scientific or technical information that could be beneficial to terrorists,
with the White House expressing their displeasure over the
publication.49
43 National Security Decision Directive 189, issued September 29, 1985 by
President Ronald Reagan.
44 Ibid.
45 Published by the American Society for Microbiology.
46 Ronald J. Jackson et aI., 'Expression of a Mouse lnterleukin-4 by a
Recombinant EctromeliaVirus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte
Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox', 75 Journal
of Virology 1205 (2001).
47 Resnik, above n 3.
48 Donohue, above n 39.
49 Ibid.
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By March 2002, the Department of Homeland Security had begun to
implement an information security policy, and Government concern
over the impact of the publication of research findings increased when
two further publications appeared in scientific journals in 2002. In
May 2002, the National Academy of Sciences published the findings of
a study on a protein used by the smallpox virus to evade the human
immune system.50 The journal's editors stated that they had decided
to publish despite some demands not to publish because of the
potential misuse of the information by terrorists.51 The following July,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
published a paper in their journal, Science, reporting how a group of
scientists in New York had recreated the polio virus in the laboratory
from DNA bought on-line.52 This publication stirred considerable
political controversy, with a· motion censuring the AAAS being
introduced into the House of Representatives, referring to the
publication in Science as 'a blueprint that could conceivably enable
terrorists to inexpensively create human pathogens for release on the
people of the United States. '53 Additionally, the resolu tion called
upon the Executive to exercise greater control of publication
restrictions on any research receiving any Federal funding.54 In
response to growing criticism from the Government, in October 2002
the National Academies55 issued the Statement on Science and Security
in an Age ofTerrorism, supporting editorial censorship of a 'narrowly
defined class of information',56 however no attempt was made to
define what would constitute that category of information. In
response to the issue of the imposition of government censorship, the
National Academies reiterated their belief that the government should
50 Proceedings of the National Academy ofSciences, June 25, 2002, vol. 99 No,
13,8808-8813 available at http://www,pnas,or~/c~i/reprinlIllU I 1:1 I
8R08?maxtoshow-&HrrS-10&hits=10&RESULTFORMA'!'=1&andl lrexa
cttitle=and&andorexactti tJeabs=and&fulltext=smallpox&and (lrl'X Jcl full t
ext=and &searchid=1&FIRS'rINDEX=O&sortspec=relevance& rl'Sl lU rce I)'
pe=HWCfr. accessed November 2 2006.
51 Richard Monastersky, 'Publish and Perish? As the nation fights
terrorists, scientists weigh the risks of releasjng sensitive information',
Research and Publishing, The Chronicle of Higher Education, October 11,
2002 available at http://chronicle.com/weekly I v49 lin7 I07al11 lin1. htm,
accessed November 1 2006.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. See also House Resolution 514.2002. 107th Congress, Introduced by
Rep. Dave Weldon, July 26, 2002.
54 Jennifer Couzin, 'Bioterrorism: A Call for Restraint on Biological Data',
Science, 297 (5582), 2 August 2002,749 -751.
55 Representing the National Academies of Science, Engineering and
Medicine and the National Research Council. The National Academies
acts as advisor to the government on matters of science, engineering,
and medicine.
56 Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis, Academe,
Washington, Nov IDec 2003,Vol. 89, Iss, 6, at 34.
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focus on restriction of information the subject of government
classification.57 However, the policy of the National Academies does
not address the question of overclassification of information by the
government. In January 2003, members of the Journal Editors and
Authors Group, representing the American Society for Microbiology,
the National Academy of Sciences, and the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, issued a statement on the publication of
research. Included was a new editorial policy whereby submitted
papers would in future be vetted by editors, who could reject
manuscripts if they 'conclude that the potential harm' of publication
outweighs the potential societal benefits.'58 Several researchers
reportedly felt the need to edit papers submitted for publication, or
withdraw them in light of this policy.59 The result was that by the end
of 2003 the editorial boards of all scholarly scientific journals had
imposed a self-censorship regime in an attempt to avert further
government intervention.
Governmental concern in Australia over the content of scholarly
journals has, since 2001, largely focussed on the publication of
persuasive speech. Schedule 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005
(Cth) repealed the previous sedition offences, replacing them with a
range of new offences in Part 5.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth), including
that of urging violence within the community.60 A number of factors
can possibly explain the apparent lack of concern over the content of
scientific publications. As discussed earlier, the publication of
information relating to nuclear energy, and nuclear, chemical, or
biological weaponry is already subject to legislative restrictions on
publication. Additionally, the fields of scientific publication in
Australia are limited, many specialising in plant and marine biology.61
Researchers seeking dissemination and recognition of their work will
often opt to submit research papers to international journals rather
than locally published journals.62 In 2005, the first signs of interest by
the Australian Government in the content of scientific publications
arose when the National Health and Medical Research Council
57 Ibid; also see Kelly Field, 'Federal Officials Ask Journal Not to Publish
Bioterrorism Paper', Chronicle of Higher Education, July 172005,11.
58 Journal Editors and Authors Group, Proceedings of the National Academy of'
Sciences, Vol 100, 1464.
59 Monastersky, above n 51 at 8.
60 Criminal Code (Cth) s 80.2(5)-(6).
61 For" example, of 23 scholarly scientific journals published by the CSIRO,
14 were in the fields of plant and environmental biology or marine
biology.
62 This is evidenced by the fact that the Australian mousepox research was
published in the Journal of Virology in the U.s., even though it was the
result of a cooperative research project between the Australian National
University and the CSIRO. This is likely to be attributed to the greater
reach of internationally published journals and the greater prestige
typically attributed to internationally published journals.
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(NHMRC), the Australian Vice Chancellors' Committee (AVCC) and
the Australian Research Council (ARC) established a working group
on responsible research practices to review the joint NHMRC/AVCC
Statement and Guidelines on Research Practice.63 Submissions On the
publication of potentially sensitive information were made by the
Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Defence, and
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC), and the Australian Safeguards
and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO).64 In the first consultative draft
released in February 2006, the issue of the publication of potentially
sensitive research is not addressed. However, in the introduction to
Chapter 5, 'Publication and Dissemination of Research Findings', the ~
working group restated the importance of the free dissemination of
research results: .
Publication and dissemination of research findings are essential parts
of the research process and are required to inform other researchers,
professional practitioners and the wider community. The research
process is not complete until the results have been made available to
others as widely as possible in an accessible form. "65
Early in 2006, the AVCC was informed that the Commonwealth was
considering whether legislative restrictions on exporters of prescribed
goods, which are administered by the Department of Defence, should
be expanded to cover 'intangible technology transfer'.66 This position
was again adopted in a paper presented to the Australian Vice-
Chancellors' Committee, Deputy and Pro-Vice-Chancellors (Research)
Meeting in July 2006, prepared jointly by DFAT, ASNO, Defence and
PM&C.67 In this paper, the Government warned of the dangers of
making information that could have possible implications for national
security freely available. Citing the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences' decision to self-censor scientific publications, the
Government's submission warned that:
Academics and researchers need to be aware of the possible security
implications of their work and discoveries ... Researchers will need to
consider security issues from the conceptual stage of work programs -
63 The NHMRC & AVCC represent major institutional research bodies,
including universities. The ARC is the major distributor of government
funding of research in Australia. .
64 Information provided November 7 2006 by Ros Engledow, Assistant
Director - Coordination, Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee,
contactable at rxe(a)aVCc.edll.nll.
65 The second draft of the revised Statement, Chapter 5, p 25, available at
http://www.nhmrq~ov.au/pllbJications/ files/ncrcr.pdf. accessed
October 30 2006.
66 Sophie Morris, 'Ideas come under anti-terrorism review', Australian
Financial Review, 18 September 2006, 33.
67 Sensitive Technologies: The Tertiary Sector's Responsibilities, September
2006, available at http://www.asno.dfat.gov.au/publications / 2006
060901 sensitive technologies.pdf. accessed October 1 2006.
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and keep it under periodic review, since initial objectives may change
as the research progresses. Further, researchers could consider
sharing the findings of their work with government before publishing
to manage the risk of the proliferation of critical knowledge."68
The completed NHMRC/AVCC Statement and Guidelines on Research
Practice has not yet been released, and it remains uncertain if, or the
extent to which, the final guidelines will address the Government's
concerns through the implementation of a self-censorship regime.
4. Do Restrictions Matter?
If we value the pursuit of knowledge, we must be free to follow
wherever that search may lead us. The free mind is not a barking dog,
to be tethered on a ten-foot chain.69
Is the free flow of informing speech important to either individuals or
society? The freedom to pursue and advance knowledge as a public
good is a view held since the time of Socrates' advocacy of freedom of
the academy.7o The modern concept of scientific freedom can be
traced to the 1850 Prussian Constitution, which declared that 'science
and its teaching shall be free', and applied to universities, academics,
and students. Broadly. it refers to the right of teachers, students,
researchers, scientists and academic institutions to be independent in
the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge, with the intention of
protecting the objectl\'1 ty of scientific and social inquiry.71 Like
academic freedom, the freedom of scientists to publish research
enables the creation. preservation, and dissemination of knowledge.
However, the issue of censorship of scientific or technical publications
is not new. As discussed above, both the U.S. and Australian
governments have found the necessity to classify even the most basic
discoveries in certain prescribed fields, such as nuclear energy, and
prohibited the dissemination of information for the purpose of the
development of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological or
chemical weapons. Non-military applications of nuclear technologies,
however, are generally limited to nuclear power generation or
medical applications, where developments generally occur within a
framework of government supervision or regulation. Advances in
communications and computer technologies in recent decades have
brought about debate over the publi~ation of research in'
68 Ibid, at 4.
69 Adlai E. Stevenson Jr. (1900 - 1965), speech at the University of
Wisconsin, Madison, October 8,1952.
70 To Socrates the pursuit of truth was a divine mission. The Socratic
freedom of the scholar and student was rooted in the belief that the
pursuit of truth was a calling, which transcended the reach of any
earthly authority. See generally Gerasimos Santas, Xenophon, Socrates.
Routledge, Kentucky, USA, 1999.
71 Report Of The First Global Colloquium Of University Presidents, Columbia
University, January 18-19,2005.
Science or Securihj 65
cryptography. Pressure was brought to bear on researchers and
publishers in this field to self-censor scholarly papers and conference
presentations, and eventually the American Council of Education
agreed to a voluntary self-censorship regime with respect to
cryptography.72
Researchers across the sciences are at odds over the point of balance
between scientific freedom and issues of national security. The notion
of 'scientific freedom' as a public good has been criticised as
'employing unrealistic notions and descriptions of the contemporary
practice of science',73 ignoring the realities of commercial and security
considerations,74 However, competing interests do not negate the
public's interest in having a free and open flow of scientific
information. The progress of scientific development is likely to slow if
restrictions are imposed, either by governments or editorial boards.
Advances in diverse fields of science typically arise from the
development of information contributed to the body of knowledge by
other researchers,75 and the primary effect of censoring the
publication of scientific research will be a reduction in the amount and
type of data available to international and domestic research
communities.76 The importance of international cooperation and
collaborati'on in scientific research has long been acknowledged: 'In
one country,. there is always a certain inbreeding of ideas'. 77 Many
governments have indicated their intention of promoting the
development of biotech industries, with Singapore currently
developing a 'Biopolis', an international research and development
centre for the biological sciences.78 Censorship has the potential to
72 Monastersky, above n 51, at 5.
73 CA McLeish, Reactions to Self-censorship, 20th Pugwash Workshop Study
Group on the Implementation of the CBW Conventions, Geneva,
November 2003, at 2, available at http://www.pu~wash.orglreports/
cbw / cbw20 / cbw20-mcleish.htm, accessed November 3, 2006.
74 Ibid.
75 Arvin S Quist, above n 8, at 142.
76 In a 1980 study over 63% of significant scientific and technical
information was produced and published outside ,the US, increasing
from 25% in the 1950s and 1960s. P. Hernon and CR. McClure, Federal
Information Policies in the 1980s: Conflicts and Issues, Ablex Publishing,
New Jersey, 1987, at 219, citing the U.S. Congressional Research Service.
A 1984 study by the same authors, indicated that over 44% of the
citations found in U.s. scientific and technological publications were
from foreign sources.
77 J von Neuman, Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Hearings before the Special
Committee on Atomic Energy, U.s. Senate, on S. 1717, A Bill for the
Development and Control of Atomic Energy, Part 2, 79th Cong., 2nd
Sess., Jan. 25, 28-31, and Feb. 1, 1946, U.s. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., pp. 210-211 (1946)].
78 See http://www.biomed-singapore.com/bms/s~/enuk/index.htmI.
ill$ accessed June 1, 2007.
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keep researchers oblivious to other's work in the same field, which
can then lead to the duplication of effort and ultimately the wasting of
limited resources. 79 The dissemination of scientific information has,
like other scholarly works, both formal (publications, conference
presentations, etc) and informal processes (discussions,
correspondence, etc).80 The exchange of ideas and information within
scientific communities can also result in contributions to
developments made in other fields of science, with restrictions on the
communication of ideas and information likely to have an adverse
impact on scientific progress generally,81 and may in fact be counter-
productive. Restrictions on scientific information may have the effect
of inhibiting the development of measures that can be applied to
counter biological threats that arise from terrorists and that occur
naturally.82
In addition to depending upon a knowledge base developed from
others' contributions, science, like other disciplines relies on free and
open discussion of theories and findings throughout the development
of research output. 'Free dissemination of information and open
discussion is an essential part of the scientific process. Each separate
study of nature yields an approximate result and inevitably contains
some errors and omissions. Science gets at the process of truth by a
continuous process of self-examination, which remedies omissions
and corrects errors. The process requires free disclosure of results,
general dissemination of findings, interpretations, conclusions, and
widespread verification and criticism of results and conclusions.'83
As with most disciplines, researchers in the sciences place heavy
reliance on the process of review of research work by peers with
publication of research and conference presentations allowing
research to be subjected to the scrutiny of a wide range of experts in
the field of work,84 The possibility of inaccuracies, increased costs,
and delays in research are likely to arise from an inadequate process
of peer review, with the process of peer review likely to be
undermined if restrictions are imposed, whether by government or
editors. Inadequate scrutiny of research findings by others can
79 Gelhorn W, Security, Loyalty, and Science, (1950), at 44.
80 Quist, above n 8 at144.
81 Ibid, 143.
82 Donohue above n 39 at 334. Naturally occurring biological threats, such
as AIDS, SARS, influenza, and food borne pathogens arguably pose a far
greater risk to national and international security, than the threat posed
by terrorist use of pathogens.
83 American Association for the Advancement of Science, Committee on
Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, 'The Integrity of Science',
American Scientist 53, 174-198, June 1965, p. 177.
84 Ibid. at 144 -145.
Science or Securitlf 67
ultimately result in a lowering of scientific and technical standards in
a given field.85
5. The Trade-off between Science and Security - The
Future of the Free Flow of Scientific Information
As with any free speech debate, the extent that censorship of scientific
information is justifiable is fundamentally determined by balancing
the competing interests, in this case raising the question of the
proportionality of responses to the perceived threat to national
security. Debate over the proportionality of responses to the threat of
terrorism has been central to the broader legal and political debate
over the limits of democratic governments' legitimate actions in the
fight against terrorism. A proportionate response requires a rational
connection between a legitimate aim and the means adopted to
achieve that aim, and assessment of the effectiveness of the measure(s)
adopted and of the cost or burden imposed in order to achieve it.86
Roach argues that 'proportionality analysis is not a simple matter of
declaring a security strategy to be proportionate or relying on a crude
evaluation of the comparative harm,s of terrorism and rights
infringement',87 and that a proper analysis of the proportionality of
any particular response to the threat of terrorism requires a 'calm
assessment of the effectiveness of each measure'.88
The difficulty in determining the proportionality of any response to
threats to national security is that an assessment of the reasonableness
of these responses requires an objective evaluation of the threat or
potential harm. The reasonableness of any restriction on scientific
publications, whether imposed by government or applied by editors
in response to governmental pressure, can only be measured with an
understanding of the actual threat presented and the risks associated
with this threat. However, because of restrictions on the availability
of information concerning matters of national securitY, this is not
possible for those outside of some limited government circles, who
may ultimately have a vested political interest in maintaining an
atmosphere of fear within society. For those outside of these circles,
reliance has to be placed on perceptions formed from the limited
available information from governments. Although the risks from
and potential consequences of the malicious use of scientific
information may be high, there is very little information available on
the actual threat. Donohue argues that the actual threat of the
malicious use of biological sciences by terrorist is bounded, with few
85 Ibid.
86 Kent, Roach, 'Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: Must We
Trade Rights For Security? The Choice Between Smart, Harsh, or
Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain' 27 Cardozo Law
Review 2151, at 2172.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid
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terrorists having the knowledge, capability, or access to materials to
pose a high probability threat:
While, then, terrorism using CBNRW remains a low probabili ty / high
consequence event, any number of other threats-not least of which is
naturally-occurring outbreaks of disease-represent high
probability /high consequence threats. By cutting off research in
microbiology, the state limits its ability to fend off possibly more
likely, and just as devastating, disease.89
Does the perceived threat justify the application of restrictions on the
free flow of informing speech? Is the application of legislative
restrictions, or the imposition of self-censorship, on the free flow of
informing speech reasOl)ably necessary for the preservation of a civil
and ordered society? Among the difficulties that arise from these
issues is that much of the information has multiple uses, both
legitimate and illegitimate. Critics of the publication in the U.S. of the
findings of the Australian research into the mousepox virus warned of
the risks of making information on how the virus could be made
more virulent available for military or terrorist purposes.90 Those
who defended the publication warned of the risks, including those
from naturally occurring pathogens, to the broader community from
not having the information available to other researchers.91
Numerous scientific authors and U.S. publishers have reportedly felt
pressured into self-censoring in an attempt to avert government
regulation, seeing 'governance rather than curtailment as the correct
course of action. '92 However, in adopting a policy of self-censorship,
a central issue is whether the competing interests are given the
appropriate weighting. Critical to this question is the context in
which publishers have reacted. Is the perceived threat reasonable?
Publishers of scientific journals may, by imposing a system of self-
censorship, identify with, and validate a threat model, 'with
unreasoned methods susceptible to international, institutional, and
political biases.'93 Fundamental to this argument are the assumptions
that publication of multi purpose scientific or technical information
increases the likelihood that that information will in fact be used for
terrorist or other offensive purposes,94 and that the threat is
sufficiently reasonable to justify the impact on the body of scientific
knowledge. Donohue questions the assessme.nt of the risk of terrorists .
utilising publicly available scientific information that is accepted by
scientific publishers:
89 Donohue, above n 39 at 334.
90 Monastersky, above n 51 at 8.
91 Ibid; Donohue, above n 39 at 333.
92 McLeish, above n 73, at 9.
93 Ibid 4.
94 Ibid.
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What frequently falls off the table in consideration of counterterrorist
provisions is that, although terrorism attracts a great deal of attention, the
actual threat is bounded. Fewer terrorist organizations than one othenvise
might think have the intent, knowledge, and capability to execute an attack
using a weapon of mass destruction. Moreover, there are limits on even these
groups' ability to use such weapons. 95
The reasonableness of the decision by the Journal Editors and Authors
Group has been called into question because of the haste with which
the decision was made, and the unscientific approach adopted by not
testing the threat model presented by the government before
accepting it.96 Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Australian research
organisations and publishers have not, as yet, felt the need for the
tightening of publication guidelines to meet national security
demands, although it remains to be seen whether there will be further
pressure applied by the government. It is important to recognize that
the application of restrictions on the dissemination of scientific
information is not the only mechanism of control available to
governments. Is censorship the most appropriate response to the
perceived threat of terrorists utilising published scientific
information? What other options are available that minimises the
threat of a malicious use of scientific research whilst maintaining a
reasonable. degree of scientific freedom? Several options, discussed
below, are worthy of consideration.
5.1 Control of access to biological materials
The application of restrictions on the availability of the biological
materials is an alternative that should be further considered. Both the
U.S. and Australian governments have utilised this approach with the
availability of nuclear materials and, in recent years, the supplies
necessary for the manufacture of prohibited drugs. The growth in the
manufacture of so-called designer drugs has coincided with the
availability of chemical formulae through the internet, making
restriction of information needed difficult, if not impossible.97
Governments have limited the likelihood of harm through regulation
of the availability of the materials necessary to manufacture the illegal
substances.98 Restrictions of constituent materials also form a part of
the control of nuclear technologies and weapons of mass destruction.
This is, arguably, a more effective means of limiti!lg the likelihood of
an illegitimate use of the information, whilst not restricting legitimate
use for scientific research. However, the difficulty then becomes a
95 Donohue, above n 39 at 332.
96 See p. 10 supra; also see McLeish, above n 73, at 9.




98 For example see Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) s 24A.
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question of access by scientific researchers to the necessary resources
for legitimate purposes.
5.2 Restricting research in high-risk areas
One of the fundamental approaches to the control of nuclear
technologies and the information associated with it has been to
impose strict controls on research in this field. The application of this
approach to biological sciences may limit the threat of a malicious use
of biological resources, although unlikely to eradicate it altogether.99
Tailoring restrictions to limit the burden imposed on research could
limit the potential for malicious use, for example, applying restrictions
based on type of disease, type of research or purpose of research. lOO
However, there are difficulties in applying this approach to the
biological sciences. It requires categorisation of the biological
sciences. Compartmentalisation of this type requires an ability to
neatly categorise the research conducted. However, as discussed
earlier in this paper,lOl compartmentalisation of the biological sciences
is not a simple matter, with advances often arising from unrelated
research. Additionally, biological sciences are fundamental to the
advancements in public health. l02 Donohue argues that, 'While it is in
the national interest to prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining
biological weapons, it is not in the national interest to stunt research
into (more likely) naturally occurring disease.' Furthermore, the
biological sciences have now become central to progress in a number
of diverse industries, including pharmaceuticals, oil, and plastics. l03
Applying restrictions on who can be involved in specific areas of
research is no guarantee that the information will not be used
maliciously. Federal authorities in the U.S. traced the strain of the
anthrax used in the 2001 attacks in the U.S. to a U.S. Army research
facility. In May 2002, New Scientist reported that:
The DNA sequence of the anthrax sent through the U.S. mail in 2001
has been revealed and confirms suspicions that the bacteria originally
came from a U.s. mili tary laboratory ...The two reference strains tha t
appear identical to the attack strain most likely originated at the U.S.
99 Donohue, above n 39 at 332. In spite of government efforts to prevent
information on the atomic bomb from being published information was
widely available, including an article by Edward Teller, one of the
creators of the weapon, published in EnClJclopedia Americana. See L.A.
Powe 'The H-Bomb Injunction', (1990) 61 University of Colorado Law
Review, 55, at 62
100 Donohue, above n 39 at 332.
101 Above, Part 3 Do Restrictions Matter.
102 Ibid 330. This argument has been central to recent debate in the u.s. and
Australia over the conduct of stem cell and embryonic research.
103 Ibid.
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Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at Fort
Derrick, Maryland.104
Although no prosecution was ever commenced, the U.S. Attorney-
General subsequently. announced that the principal suspect was a
former employee of the research facility. 105
5.3 Self-regulation
As has been previously acknowledged national security interests can,
and do, require the imposition of reasonable restrictions on
information where it is judged that the risk of harm outweighs the
benefits that may be obtained from its distribution. The restriction of
multiple purpose informatiol) is arguably more easily justifiable
where the 'legitimate' purpose has limited application, such as
nuclear technologies, where prohibition rather than regulation is
desired. 106 However, this is not so clear where the information has a
broader range of legitimate uses, such as microbiology and other
biological sciences. The difficulty here is identifying possible
illegitimate uses of information:
The assumption that dual use technology will fulfil its potential and
be used for,hostile purposes is both linear and deterministic and is
incompatible with the normative structure of the model of scientists
which sees pursuit of science as a social goOd. 107
While self-censorship may be seen as a preferable means of vetting the
dissemination of scientific information, the reasonableness of this will
depend on the extent to which authors and publishers are able to
establish a method by which appropriate criteria are used to judge the
potential harm that could arise from publication. However, what
criteria are appropriate? Although there may be difficulty in
establishing criteria that are applicable in all circumstances, there are
certain factors that researchers and editors could take into
consideration. These include the availability of the necessary
biological components to utilise the information, current research in a
given field, an objective assessment of the possible beneficial uses of
the information contained in the research, and an objective, and
rational assessment of the threat posed by the possible malicious use
of that information.
Although many see the advancement of knowledge, particularly
scientific knowledge, as a supreme human value, political realities
104 Available at http://www.newscientist.com/artide.ns?id=dn2265.
accessed June 1, 2007.
105 Marilyn W Thompson, The Pursuit of Steven HatfilI, available at
http://www.ph.ucla.edll/ epi I bioter I pursllithatfilJ.htmL accessed June
1,2007.
106 McLeish, above n 73 at 9.
107 Ibid,
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dictate that this objective is no longer practicable. It is undeniable that
we have entered a new era of international insecurity caused by the
threat of terrorism, with governments, researchers, and publishers all
faced with the need to consider a fundamental trade off between
scientific progress and national security concerns, and finding where
the appropriate balance lies. National security has long been used by
governments to justify the imposition of restrictions on various forms
of speech. Legislative and executive authority is used to censor, or
impose criminal penalties on, speech, justified by the perceived need
to protect national interests. Restrictions imposed on the
dissemination of information from nuclear research have been a
contributing factor in constraining the development of nuclear
weaponry, particularly by non-state actors. However, the biological
sciences pose a different challenge. In addition to the broader
legitimate uses of information within the biological sciences, the past
application of restrictions has generally arisen through a process of
reasoned consideration of all factors, including the objective risk from
improper use of information. This has been difficult in the current
political climate. The unquestioning acceptance of a politically
influenced risk assessment, although expedient, should not be
assumed to contribute to any real reduction in the threat of terrorism.
The risks involved in not publishing are too great to allow decisions
like this to be made without an objective assessment of the threat that
is purported to justify the restriction. To do so jeopardises not only
the independence of researchers (already threatened by commercial
interests), but also the quality and quantity of information contributed
to the body of scientific knowledge.
